Andrew Pratt

This is the first part in a series of articles that will trace the development of ChosOn military techniques, the influences on them, and the implications of this for the development of ChosOn martial arts. The idea for these articles came from reading too many histories of Korean martial arts that displayed an almost complete lack of knowledge of the history of Korea, illustrated by the huge gaps in the history given (for instance, the Hwarang would be mentioned, and then often as not, there would be nothing else mentioned until the Japanese Imperial period, a gap of over a thousand years and two Korean kingdoms). I will not, though, be attempting to re-write history. Although I will be concentrating on the military side of things, this does not mean that the military should be seen as more important than the civilian/political/economic spheres. Civilian politics was the main shaper of ChosOn society. Nor will I introduce much new material. Most of what follows can easily be found in Nahm's Korea: Tradition and Transformation, and Lee's  A New History of Korea. I have also made use of my BA dissertation In Search of Clues to the Development of Korean Martial Arts During the Yi Dynasty and papers by David Jewell, A History of TaeKwon-Do  and Dakin Burdick, People and Events of T'aegwondo's Formative Years. A modified form of the  McCune-Reishauer system has been used for romanization.

Part 1: Founding a Kingdom

For the student of Korea's military past, the ChosOn period starts with a bang. A quick look at the life of the first king, Yi SOng-gye (1358-1408, also known as T'aejo which was the official name given to him on his death), shows that he was a military man with an illustrious career behind him. Yi SOng-gye had followed his father into the military, as the hereditary system of appointments required, and proved even more skilful than his father.

Yi SOng-gye cut his teeth fighting the Jurchen along the north-eastern frontier before he was promoted and sent to combat the pirates who were raiding the south-western coast. Yi's name obviously became known to the KoryO court (the state previous to ChosOn was called KoryO, and it is from this state that we derive the modern name Korea) and Yi was called to the capital (then at KaeryOng (now called KaesOng)) where he became involved in politics. The reason for this, and how politics was conducted at the time, is a little unclear. We mainly rely on the official period history of the KoryO kingdom, the KoryOsa, but this history was actually compiled during the ChosOn period and can be expected to promote Yi and to justify his seizure of the throne.

The Rise and Fall of Kings:

The events as recorded are that the Yuan kingdom collapsed under pressure from Ming China during the 1360s. The Ming, known during this civil war as the 'Red Banner bandits' or the 'Red Turbans,' had invaded KoryO (in 1359 and 1361) during their defeat of the Yuan and Yi SOng-gye had played a 'major role' in defending KoryO. The KoryO Court was linked to Yuan by marriage and had been under Yuan supervision ever since Yuan had invaded and defeated KoryO in 1259. Therefore a split arose in the KoryO Court. Should KoryO side with the failing Yuan, with whom KoryO had family relationships with and something approaching traditional political relations with, or switch to the new and victorious Ming state?  Ming's earlier invasions caused distrust in the KoryO Court. As a result, Byzantine subterfuge overtook the court. Various boy-kings were installed and removed. KoryO switched its allegiance to Ming, and then back to Yuan. Yi SOng-gye, along with General Ch'oe YOng, became involved with the groups that supported Ming. When the Ming resurrected  ancient claims for parts of northern KoryO, Yi was charged (probably by his rivals) with taking an army and mounting an assault on Ming. Yi argued against this strategy but was sent anyway. Encamped at the Yala river in the spring of 1388, he changed his mind and returned to KaegyOng and seized the palace and installed another boy-king on the throne. Yi then removed his rivals one-by-one until, four years later, he felt strong enough to declare himself king.

How can these events be analysed? The ChosOn historians identified the collapse of KoryO as the result of allowing Buddhist monks and the military to become involved in politics, rather than relying on Confucianism, and also because of  the poor moral quality of the KoryO kings. Yi, therefore came to power because he supported and encouraged the adoption of Neo-Confucianism and was morally correct in supporting Ming. Modern historians  extended the  interpretation and argued that Yi had sided with new Neo-Confucian scholars, who were mostly educated in the countryside and were critical of the corruption in the capital, to overthrow the  KoryO state. However, recent analysis of the ruling clans over this period question this position. This new analysis suggests that there was no new influx of clans into the ruling elite. In fact, only four clans (out of 30 odd elite clans)  can be readily identified as completely new. Moreover, out of all the officials in government, only ONE came from rural areas. In other words, the movement for change came from within the ruling clans in the capital.

It seems, therefore, that more questions can be asked of Yi SOng-gye. When did he actually decide that he would become king? Was he manoeuvring for political power as soon as he arrived in the capital, or did he suddenly decide on the banks of the Yalu to seize the throne? Where was Ch'oe YOng and his army when Yi seized the capital? How much political power did Yi really have, or was he just a pawn of faction? Cho Chun, a king maker, once boasted that he controlled Yi SOng-gye and gave him his every idea. Certainly, it seems that after Yi became king, he showed little interest in the Neo-Confucian policies that were enacted in his name. Yi rationalized ChosOn's position to Ming as 'serving the more powerful neighbour.' This was a pragmatic political  policy, not, as some modern commentators have tried to suggest, a form of toadyism or syphocantism.

Trouble From the South:

Apart from the fighting along the northern frontier, KoryO forces were also combating another foe. This was the problem of piratical attacks. I have already noted that Yi SOng-gye was involved in repulsing the pirates, but I do not know, as yet, when this was. The attacks were mostly occurring along the south-western coast. In fact, pirates had been visiting Korean shores for many hundreds of years and, where Japanese pirates were involved, was generally connected to crop failures on the Japanese islands. It should also be noted that one man's pirates are another man's traders. In 1366, the pirates came close to attacking the capital. The attacks reached their peak from 1375 and over the next thirteen years, 378 raids are recorded. In response to the increased activities of the pirates, a Bureau of Armament was established  in 1377 under a 'military official' called Ch'oe Mu-sOn. The Bureau constructed naval vessels and made various weapons to equip them. In one battle near the mouth of the River KUm, it is claimed that over 500 pirate vessels were sunk or damaged. However, the pirate attacks continued unabated (probably every harvest time). In retaliation, in 1389,  KoryO mounted an expedition, led by one Pak Wi, of one hundred vessels to attack the pirate bases on the island of Tsushima. The KoryO forces claim to have destroyed some 300 pirate ships in that battle.

Stately Organs:

King U (r: 1374-1388), probably under pressure from the anti-Ming faction, revived a military institution, called the Muye togam, to prepare for a military campaign in Manchuria. After he was deposed by YI SOng-gye, this organ seems to have disappeared. It is recorded that the HullyOngwan was established in the first year of Yi's reign to provide a unified military structure. This was obviously an attempt to disarm his rivals. There was resistance to this and it took several years for all the private armies to brought under central control. The attempt did not actually begin until ChOngjong's brief reign of 1398-1400. Once the private armies were under central control, the troops were divided into three armies. This system was called the UihUng samgunbu, or Three Righteous Armies. The troops were stationed in the regions as required. The main garrisons were in the troublesome north east, which had two barracks, and along the southern coast, which had three barracks. The naval forces were also concentrated along the southern coast. Some of these facilities were new, and so indicate the strength of the continuing pirate problem. In 1418 a 'fortress' was built at a place called Pyongyong in the south-western corner of Cholla(do) province, 'as the seat of the military command with the whole area of the Cholla-do province under its operational control.'¹ I do not know why this fortress was constructed, but presume that either the previous harbour had silted up or the navy had begun to use larger ships. Alternatively, advances in technology allowed them to construct a base in a strategically better location. There was also another naval barracks guarding the entrance to the River Han, and the capital beyond, now relocated to Hanyang (now called Seoul). However, we do not really know much about the structure and training of the military other than it would seem that the generals maintained private armies, probably composed of troops from their home province. The researcher is left with questions as to how much training the troops  did and what weapons were they trained in.

There was one other administrative change that would have large repercussions for the ChosOn state. Because of the military coup in KoryO in 1196 and the military domination of the Court in the final years of the KoryO state, the Neo-Confucian advisers to the ChosOn state made sure that military personal could not rise to the highest ranks. This meant that for all policy decisions, only civilian personal could advise the king. Ceremonially, the civilian courtiers were required to line up on the left and the military officials on the right. This gave birth to the term yangban and this institution was, in theory, supposed to give both branches equal access to the king, but as related above, in reality the civilian courtiers retained power for themselves.

A Way of Fighting:

Contemporary histories offer us the word subak which is considered to be the name of a martial art. The first thing to note is that two different types of ideographs are used to represent the word subak. At present I do not know if they were used interchangeably, or whether one term was used first and then, later, the other term. It is conceivable that these ideographs could represent two different martial arts rather than a single martial art. The Chinese ideographs all use the symbol for 'hand.' The left most ideograph means just that, 'a hand.' In the first word, the second ideograph means, 'to clap,' while in the second word, the second ideograph means, 'to strike.'  It seems clear, though, that the emphasis is on the hand, and not the foot. These words appear from the middle of the KoryO period and were used during this period of  the ChosOn state. They then die out of usage. The context of usage is very important. Nahm suggests that these arts were mentioned because the KoryO kings were watching subak competitions and gambling. He is, presumably, reflecting how events are related in the histories, in other words, that the kings were morally disreputable. Since KoryO seems to have been quite active militarily, it should not be thought that people were practising these arts for enjoyment. They were probably part of the KoryO national and private military training systems, and continued under the ChosOn conscription system. An elite guard, called the Pangp'aegun (shielding soldiers), selected recruits by having a competition where entrants had to beat three rivals before being selected.² This is recorded as occurring in 1410, but was probably also conducted both before and after this date. Curiously, it is also said that government slaves were particularly attracted to this unit. Could it be that the potential life in this unit was less odious than their lives in other departments of government? If a slave served in this elite unit, which presumably lived a dangerous life, did this mean that they were given freedom on completion of service? Given that whatever a slave did it would not probably be considered worthy of emulation by a free man, this seems a strange compliment to subak. That is, if subak was being practised among the slave population (and how large was the slave population and what percentage practised subak?), then this would suggest a low opinion of subak in the military and population as a whole.

The  World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) official history of their art adds a little more to our knowledge of subak. This history claims that a book about subak was published. Unfortunately, it does not give the name of the book, nor when it was published. Also, the statement is slightly confusing because it says that the book was to 'teach the game as a martial art,' whereas the WTF line of argument in the following paragraph is that the martial art of subak was becoming a game  among the population as a whole. More usefully, the WTF cites as evidence of subak being practised in the population, 'A historical record indicates that people from both Chungchong and Cholla provinces once  gathered at the village of Chakji located along the provincial boundary to compete in  Subak.' However, there are again problems with this statement. First, the record is not named and dated. Moreover, the event may only have occurred 'once' and not regularly. Finally, the WTF claims that, 'Furthermore, people who aspired to be employed by the military department of the royal government were eager to learn Subak because it was included as one of the major subjects of the test to be taken by the applicants.' This statement is arguing that the officer-class was practising subak for promotion. It could, however, refer to the slave unit Pangp'aegun refered to above. Assuming for the moment that it refers to an officer-class, then this again suggests a small section of the military. Also, under the yangban class system, the supposedly equally ranked military officials (vis-a-vis the civilian officials) were in fact kept much lower in status, both in Court rank and socially.

More Kings:

Although a new kingdom had been established, that did not mean the end to political manoeuvrings. Since the same KoryO clans were still in power, they were still jockeying for position. They formed groups round Yi's various sons and conspiracies turned violent and several sons and their supporters lost their lives as a result. It is a little unclear whether Yi abdicated and 'retired,' or ruled from behind the throne, or was even forced to go in 1399. ChOngjong also soon went in favour of his younger brother, who became T'aejong (r: 1400-1418,  These are both reign names, not their given names). One possible reason for these activities is because Ming had yet to recognize ChosOn as the new government on the peninsula. There were two reasons for this. One was that Ming had formally recognized KoryO as the legitimate state. Also, it was then standard practise to wait until the third king had mounted a throne before recognizing a state. This was because once the third king had ascended the throne, the kingdom was probably quite well established and secure. With T'aejong on the throne, Ming was able to  recognize ChosOn as the legitimate state on the peninsula. At the same time, T'aejong was able to use the authority of Ming recognition to force the remaining clans to give up their private armies.

Therefore, there is a record of successful military activity  throughout the final years of the KoryO state and into early ChosOn. We have the name of a martial art, but can only make guesses as to its composition and how widely it was practised. We have to rely on brief references in the records and from the nature of the Chinese ideographs used. Although Yi SOng-gye was from a military clan, it is unclear if this was material to his rise to kinghood. Clan politics continued throughout this period and did not ease with the creation of the new state. Finally, military reform by ChosOn occurred as the Yi family became more established on the throne. The next article will continue to trace the military history of the ChosOn state up until the Hideyoshi invasion of 1592.

¹ This information is on a plaque in the village of Pyongyong. Cited in Hamel's Journal by Hendrik Hamel, translated by Brother J.P. Buys of Taize, RAS (Korea Branch), 1994

² From the Koran Overseas Culture and Information Service page on T'aegwon-do. Note that this paper consistantly refers to T'aegwon-do's antecendent as T'aekkyOn and does not mention subak. Contrast this with the  World Taekwondo Federation  article which mentions subak but ignores T'aekkyOn!